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Abstract 
 
In theory, improvements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the 
average age of retirement, with little effect on savings rates. In many countries, however, 
retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from keeping pace with 
changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for life-cycle savings. Analyzing a 
cross-country panel of macroeconomic data, we find that increased longevity raises aggregate 
savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, though the 
effect disappears in countries with pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Demographics can affect aggregate savings behavior. Most savings models that account 
for demographics focus on the fact that people at different ages save at different rates. In these 
models, demographic change affects aggregate savings through changes in the age structure of 
the population (e.g., Deaton and Paxson 1997, Kelly and Schmidt 1996, Higgins and Williamson 
1997, Higgins 1998). However, few savings models consider another fundamental demographic 
that may affect savings rates: the length of life.        
In a simple life cycle model, a longer life span need not affect savings rates; the optimal 
response to a longer life span can be a corresponding proportional increase in working lifetime, 
with savings rates while working remaining fairly steady. However, there is empirical evidence 
at the microeconomic level (Hurd, McFadden, and Gan 1998) and at the macroeconomic level 
(Bloom, Canning, and Graham 2003) that higher life expectancy increases savings rates. This 
raises the question of why people who expect to live longer should choose to save more rather 
than simply retire later.   
We discuss four mechanisms through which life expectancy can affect savings: increased 
sickness in old age may prevent longer working lives; the influence of compound interest and 
wage growth over a longer working life may produce a wealth effect; imperfect annuity markets 
may reduce the effective returns to savings in high mortality environments due to the chance of 
dying before spending one’s wealth; and retirement incentives in social security systems may 
discourage or prevent longer worker lives. 
Using a simulation model, Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) argue that increases in 
longevity in Taiwan can explain its savings boom over the last 40 years, on the basis that 
Taiwan’s retirement age has been fixed. Along these lines, the theoretical and empirical analyses 
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in this paper reveal that the major explanation for the cross-country link between longevity and 
savings is the existence of social security programs that offer incentives to retire at a fixed age. 
Gruber and Wise (1998) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1997) show that social security rules 
in OECD countries create powerful financial incentives to retire at a particular age and that many 
workers appear to respond to these incentives. This leads to a clustering of retirement at the ages 
at which retirement incentives are introduced in each country. Similar social security 
arrangements also exist in many countries outside the OECD. For example, Social Security 
Administration (2002) reports data on social security in Taiwan. When covered workers reach 60 
years of age, they are eligible upon retirement to receive a lump sum payment based on their 
contributions to the system. A worker receives a sum equal to his or her monthly salary for each 
of the first 15 years of social security contributions. This increases to two months' salary for the 
next 15 years of contributions. This lump sum is capped at 45 months of salary, though an extra 
5 months worth of salary can be added to the lump sum by continuing to work to age 65. Thus, if 
one has worked to age 65, benefits no longer increase over time, although contributions continue. 
Two additional factors may also influence the decision to retire at younger ages. Because 
productivity declines with age, the average wage on which the lump sum is based may decrease 
over time,2 and expected benefits may decrease. In addition, as one gets older, the probability of 
dying before collecting benefits increases. Thus, Taiwanese workers have an incentive not to 
extend their working careers past 65.  
This paper explores the hypothesis that the effect of life expectancy on national savings 
rates depends on key features of the social security system in place. As we show theoretically, 
with no social security system and perfect capital markets, the optimal response to an 
                                                 
2 This is more likely to be true for manual laborers than for skilled laborers insofar as experience is an important 
element of productivity for the latter group. 
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improvement in life expectancy is to lengthen of the working life, with no (or possibly a 
negative) effect on savings rates. However, in countries where social security provisions create 
strong incentives to retire, the retirement age may effectively be fixed, so that longer life spans 
lead to longer periods of retirement and greater pre-retirement savings. 
We approach the issue first from a theoretical perspective. Our model is similar to 
Blanchard (1985) in that it considers individual savings decisions over time and aggregates 
across cohorts to find national savings. Our innovation is to allow retirement decisions, as well 
as savings decisions, to depend on life expectancy. Aggregation gives us an equation whose 
parameters we estimate using data for a panel of countries over the period 1960–2000. The 
aggregate equation includes the usual demographic and economic growth effects on savings 
found in the literature.   
 For our empirical analyses, we construct data on key features of the social security 
system in each country of the world. We summarize each system by four variables. Two dummy 
variables indicate whether or not the system covers all workers (universal coverage) and whether 
there is a retirement or earnings test to be eligible for benefits (retirement incentive). We also 
measure the replacement rate:  the proportion of an average worker's wage that a pension plan 
replaces after retirement. We distinguish the portion of the coverage that is funded (through 
investments) from the portion that operates as a pay-as-you-go system (which holds claims on 
the government for future payment). Although funded retirement systems may be similar to 
private savings, pay-as-you-go systems may displace private savings without generating national 
savings (Feldstein 1976). As expected, we find that national savings rates are higher with fully 
funded social security systems than with pay-as-you-go systems.  
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Our results indicate that higher life expectancy does not increase savings rates in the 
absence of universal coverage and retirement incentives. We find that with universal coverage 
and retirement incentives, a longer life span is associated with higher savings rates, but this 
effect disappears in systems with pay-as-you-go pension finance and high replacement rates. 
 Institutional incentives are not the only possible explanation of an effect of longevity on 
savings. As noted, there are three other possible mechanisms to consider. The first relates to the 
possibility that although individuals are living longer, the years they gain in life expectancy may 
not be healthy ones. This implies that ill health among the elderly forces retirement at a fairly 
constant age, so that the increase in life expectancy requires more savings for old age from what 
remains a fairly steady length of working life. This argument is weakened by strong evidence for 
the  "compression of morbidity," the idea that with increased life spans the relative, or even 
absolute, length of life spent in chronic ill-health toward the end of life has declined (Fries 1980, 
Fries 1989, Crimmins, Saito, and Ingegneri 1997, Crimmins 2004, Costa 2002). In our 
theoretical model we allow for the compression of morbidity by assuming that health status and 
the disutility of labor depend on age relative to life expectancy.    
A second explanation is that, with positive interest rates, a longer working life allows 
compound interest to operate over a longer period. If there is technological progress and 
economic growth, a longer working life also allows a worker to earn more when real wages are 
higher. As a result, the worker at retirement will be wealthier than before. The worker can spend 
this wealth by taking more leisure (early retirement) or by having a higher level of lifetime 
consumption (and less savings while working). If both leisure and consumption are normal 
goods, the worker will do both and the market response to a longer life span will be a lower 
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savings rate (Bloom, Canning, and Moore 2004). Our theoretical model allows for wealth effects 
associated with compound interest and real wage growth.   
A third argument is that mortality is random and thus lowers the effective interest rate by 
creating the possibility that one might die and leave unintentional bequests. As life expectancy 
increases, and the mortality rate falls, the effective rate of return to savings goes up, encouraging 
both savings and earlier retirement (Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil 2002, Zhang, Zhang, and Lee 
2003). This effect depends on lack of access to annuity markets, and the substitution effect on 
savings of higher effective interest rates outweighing the income effect. We assume perfect 
annuity markets in our theoretical model, ruling out this mechanism. However, it seems likely 
that this effect plays a role when capital markets are incomplete. Although effects through these 
alternative mechanisms are plausible, we find no evidence of an effect of life expectancy on 
savings rates in the absence of social security institutions. We find significant effects when social 
security arrangements do exist.  
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical model, 
Section 3 describes our data, Section 4 presents regression results, and Section 5 concludes.   
 
2 (i)  Theory – Individual Consumption and Retirement 
We examine the optimizing problem of agents deciding their lifetime labor supply and 
consumption and take the real wage rate, w , and interest rate, r, to be exogenous. We assume that 
the interest rate is fixed over time, but that real wages grow at the rateσ , reflecting long-run 
economic growth. 
As in Blanchard (1985) we assume an exogenous, constant death rate. Given the constant 
death rate,λ , the probability of being alive at age t is  te λ− . For an agent at birth, the probability 
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of dying at exact age t therefore follows a Poisson distribution and is te λλ − . Life expectancy is 
given by 
 
0
1( )tz t e dtλλ
λ
∞
−= =∫ . (1) 
Blanchard (1985) takes the time path of labor income to be fixed and focuses on the 
effect of a changing life span on the decision to save. We treat both savings and retirement 
decisions as endogenous. Agents compare the real wage earned to the disutility of working to 
determine if they will work. A major innovation of our model is the disutility of labor 
schedule, ( , )v z t , which we assume rises with age, t, due to failing health promoting retirement as 
individuals age. We postulate that the disutility of working at age t depends on life expectancy, 
z . Higher life expectancy is assumed to go hand in hand with improved health, reducing the 
disutility of working at each age.  
If health status at each age improves proportionately with life expectancy (the relative 
compression of morbidity), then the disutility of labor, ( , )v z t , satisfies  
 ( , ) ( , )v z t v z tα α =  (2) 
 
In other words, the health status and disutility of someone working at age 45 who has a life 
expectancy of 60 is the same as the health status and disutility of someone working at age 60 
who has a life expectancy of 80.  
We assume that at age t the agent gets the instantaneous utility[ ]( ( )) ( , )tu c t v z tχ− , where 
( ( ))u c t is the utility of consumption; ( , )v z t is the disutility of working at age t given life 
expectancy z; and χ is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when working and 0 when 
retired. We consider only full-time work or retirement and rule out part-time employment.  
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Agents make consumption and work decisions for each time t and lifetime expected 
utility is given by 
 ( ) [ ]
0
( ) ( , )tU e u c v z t dtδ λ χ
∞
− += −∫ , (3) 
where future utility is discounted at the subjective rate of time preference, δ , and is conditional 
on the probability of being alive at time t. Lifetime expected utility is maximized subject to the 
budget constraint 
 ( )t
dW w r W c
dt
χ λ= + + − , (4) 
where W  is the state variable, wealth. If the agent works at time t, he or she earns the wage ( )w t , 
which adds to wealth, while consumption, ( )c t , reduces wealth. We assume that wealth can be 
transferred from one period to another by saving or borrowing from the financial sector. This 
competitive financial sector can borrow or lend freely at the interest rate r.  
Agents are paid an effective interest rate r λ+ on their savings. This rate is larger than r, 
to compensate agents for the risk that they may die before withdrawing their savings. Similarly, 
agents who borrow pay the rate r λ+  to compensate the bank for the risk that they may die 
before repaying their borrowing. This is equivalent to treating all savings as taking the form of 
annuity purchases, while all borrowing is accompanied by an actuarially fair life insurance 
contract for the amount of the loan. Provided that a continuum of agents exists, the financial 
sector can avoid all risk by aggregating over individuals and earning zero profits. 
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The transversality condition is that lim 0t
t
W
→∞
≥ . Note that agents may plan to hold positive 
wealth indefinitely, because they do not know how long they will live.3 The control variables for 
the agent's optimization problem are  and c χ . Agents must decide when to work and when to 
retire and what their consumption stream should be.  
The Hamiltonian for this problem is  
 ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )( , ) ( )t t tH e u c t v z t w t r W t c tλ δ χ φ χ λ− +  = − + + + −    . (5) 
The following are the first-order conditions for a maximum in  and c χ :4 
 ( )H r
W
φ φ λ∂= − = − +
∂
 , (6) 
 ( ) ( ) 0tH e u c
c
λ δ φ− +∂ ′= − =
∂
, and (7) 
 
( )
( )
( , ) ( ) 0 when 1
( , ) ( ) 0 when 0
t
t
H e v Z t w t
H e v Z t w t
λ δ
λ δ
φ χ
χ
φ χ
χ
− +
− +
∂
= − + ≥ =
∂
∂
= − + ≤ =
∂
 (8) 
These conditions can be shown to yield the following: 
 ( ) ( )( )
u c
c r
u c
δ
′
= −
′′−
  (9) 
   
 1 ( ) ( ) ( , )t u c w t v z tχ ′= ⇔ ≥  (10) 
. 
The first condition implies a rising consumption level over time if the interest rate is high, 
though this effect may be small if the utility function is highly concave. If the marginal utility of 
                                                 
3 The transfer of the wealth of those who die to the financial sector exactly compensates deposit-taking institutions 
for the fact that they pay an interest rate r λ+  on deposits that exceed the risk free rate r, and rules out the need to 
consider unintended bequests.  
4 Berck and Sydaeter (1992) give sufficient conditions for a maximum. Checking that these conditions are satisfied 
is straightforward.  
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consumption falls quickly with the level of consumption (that is, if ( )u c′′− is large) the agent will 
want to smooth consumption over time. The second condition implies that agents work at time t 
so long as the utility gain from the consumption purchased by the wage they earn (the marginal 
utility of consumption multiplied by the wage) exceeds the disutility of working.    
To investigate the agents’ choices in a simple model, we assume the agent has log utility:  
( ) log( )u c c=    (11) 
We also assume the following simple explicit form for the disutility of work that obeys 
our homogeneity of degree zero assumption 
 /( , ) t z tv z t de deλ= =  (12) 
 
The parameter d measures the intensity of the disutility of work and potentially may vary 
as the nature of employment changes. Our utility function implies that marginal utility is 
 ( ) 1/u c c′ =  and that the optimal growth rate of consumption is 
 ( )c r
c
δ= −

, (13) 
so that individual consumption is given by ( )0( )
r tc t c e δ−= . The initial level of consumption, 0c , 
can be calculated from a re-parameterization of the budget constraint as follows:  
 ( ) ( )
0 0
( ) ( )
R
r t r te c t dt e w t dtλ λ
∞
− + − +=∫ ∫  (14) 
Using the result that the wage grows at the rateσ  while consumption grows at the rate 
r δ− gives us  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
0 0
R
r t r t r t te c e dt e w e dtλ δ λ σ
∞
− + − − +=∫ ∫  (15) 
or 
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( ) ( )
( )
( )
0 0
0 0
( )
Rt r te ec w
r
λ δ σ λ
λ δ σ λ
∞− + − +  
=   − + − +   
, (16) 
and so 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )0
0
1 r Rc e
w r
σ λλ δ
λ σ
− −+= −
+ −
. (17) 
For the model to make sense, we require that rσ λ< + . If this is not the case, the net 
present value of lifetime wage earnings can be infinite and the budget constraint shown in 
equation (15) is not well defined. Because we want to examine outcomes as the death rate,λ , 
varies, we assume that rσ < so that the finite budget constraint holds for any death rate. 
For a fixed retirement age, R* lower than the optimal R, we can use equation (17) to  
determine the initial consumption wage ratio and equation (13) to set the growth rate of 
consumption. This determines the time path of consumption. If there is mandatory retirement at 
age R*, equation (17) immediately implies that with 0r δ= >  and 0σ = , the effect of an 
increase in life expectancy is to lower the initial consumption-wage ratio; the income earned 
before the fixed retirement date now has to be spread over a longer life. Thus, under mandatory 
retirement longer life spans require higher savings rates. As long as wage growth is not too rapid 
this intuition will continue to hold.5 
For endogenous retirement the situation is more complex. The optimal retirement age R is 
given by the marginal condition where the disutility of working just equals the utility of the 
consumption from the wage earned:  
 ( ) ( ) '( ( ))v R w R u c R=  (18) 
   
which can be written as 
                                                 
5 At very high rates of wage growth, longer life spans can potentially create a wealth effect that leads to early 
retirement.  
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1( )
0 0
r R
R Rde w e c e
δ
λ σ β
−− 
=  
  
. (19) 
Equations (17) and (19) give two marginal conditions with two unknowns, the retirement 
age and the initial level of consumption (together with equation (13) this determines the time 
path of consumption), highlighting the joint nature of these decisions. The first-order conditions 
for optimal lifetime consumption and savings generate the initial consumption level, given by 
equation (17). Equation (17) gives a positive relationship between retirement and consumption 
because later retirement allows for a higher level of lifetime consumption (the consumption level 
converges to the constant wage level w as the retirement age rises). However, the first-order 
condition for optimal retirement given by equation (19) gives a downward-sloping relationship 
between the retirement age and consumption level; the agent works longer only if the marginal 
utility gained from the additional consumption enabled by working longer is sufficiently high, 
implying that the consumption trajectory must be lower. The intersection of the two curves gives 
the optimal retirement–consumption choice.       
Substituting for the initial level of consumption in equation (19) gives us 
 ( )
( )
( )
( )(1 )
r R
R
r R
r ede
e
σ δ
λ
σ λ
λ σ
λ δ
+ −
− −
 + −
=  
+ − 
, (20) 
which is an implicit function of the retirement age R alone.6 Similarly, we substitute out the 
retirement age in equation (19) and derive an equation that is an implicit function of 0c , the 
initial level of consumption, alone: 
 
( )
( )
1
0 0
0 0 1 ( )
r
rw cc w
r d
σ λ
λ δ σ
λ δ
λ σ
− −−
− − +
 +
= − + −  
 (21)  
                                                 
6 If the rate of wage growth is extremely high while the disutility of labor grows slowly, this equation may have no 
finite solution. However, provided that rσ λ δ< + − , the growth rate of the disutility of labor dominates and the 
agent will eventually retire.  
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We now have a set of equations that could provide the solution to the agent's maximization 
problem. Equation (20) can be solved to give the retirement age, R. Equation (21) can be solved 
to give the initial level of consumption, 0c , which together with equation (13) gives us a complete 
solution for the agent's labor supply and consumption decisions. 
Although we have a potential solution, solving the implicit functions (20) and (21) for R 
and 0c  is complex, and we do not have a complete closed-form solution. Our approach is to use 
the implicit function theorem to obtain an approximation around a special case for which we do 
have a complete closed-form solution. This special case is where the rate of time preference, rate 
of interest, and growth rate of wages are all zero ( 0rδ σ= = = ). 
The implicit function theorem implies that the optimal retirement age and initial 
consumption, for , ,r andδ σ small, can be approximated by: 
 ( ) 2 2
1 1(1 ) log( ) 1 1 log( )1log
(1 ) (1 )
d ddd d dR z r z z
d d d
σ δ
+ +   + − −   + = + − −     + +     
   
 (22) 
  
 0 2 2
0
11 log( )1 1 ( )
1 (1 ) (1 )
ddc dr z z
w d d d
σ δ
+
+
= + − +
+ + +
 (23) 
 
When 0rδ σ= = = , the retirement age is proportional to life expectancy and the consumption-
wage ratio does not change with variations in life expectancy. Individuals “stretch” their working 
lives to finance the same level of consumption over a longer life span. However, assuming 
0r δ= >  and 0σ ≥ , our results imply that the initial consumption-wage ratio rises, and savings 
falls, when life expectancy increases. The intuitive rationale for this result is that an increase in 
life expectancy magnifies the compounding effects of wage growth, interest rates, and time 
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preference. For example, suppose that the interest rate is positive and that the agent keeps to the 
proportionality result that holds in the case of , ,r δ  and σ  all being zero when life expectancy 
rises. In this scenario, when life expectancy rises, the agent will have greater wealth upon 
reaching retirement age because of the increased effects of compound interest and wage growth 
over a longer working life. The higher level of accumulated assets allows a higher level of 
consumption (spread over the entire life span). This induces a lower marginal utility of 
consumption, reducing the incentive to work and encouraging earlier retirement. The wealth 
effect generated by compound interest and wage growth over a longer life span leads to both an 
increase in consumption and an increase in leisure (early retirement).   
Let us assume that interest rates and time preference are fixed across countries and over 
time. Taking equations (17) and (23) we can write the initial consumption ratio as  
 0
0
( , , *)c g z R
w
σ=  (24) 
where we expect consumption to be rising with life expectancy when there is no mandatory 
retirement (or the mandatory retirement age is above the optimal age when people actually retire) 
but to be falling with life expectancy when the mandatory retirement constraint, R*, is binding.   
 
2 (ii)  Theory – Aggregate Consumption 
We consider an economy with a fixed life expectancy z and constant rate of growth of 
wages σ . The mandatory retirement age R, if there is one, is also fixed. This implies that each 
cohort will have the same initial consumption-wage ratio ( 0 0/c w ) and the same rate of growth of 
consumption, r δ− , though later cohorts will be richer if there is wage growth. As in Sheshinski 
(2005), aggregate consumption at time T comprises the consumption of the members of each 
cohort born at s T≤  that have survived to T and is given by 
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 ( ) ( )( )0 ( )
T
T s r T s
T sC B e c s e ds
λ δ− − − −
−∞
= ∫  (25) 
where sB  is the number of births at time s and 0 ( )c s is the initial consumption of the 
cohort born at time s. Suppose we have a constant birth rate b; population growth is then given 
by n b λ= − and we have  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0
0
T
n T z T z r T z
T T T
cC bP e w e e dz
w
λ σ δ− + − − − − −
−∞
= ∫  (26) 
where TP  is population at time T, and we drop the dependence of the initial consumption-wage 
ratio on the cohort birth year because it is independent of the cohort. Integrating this equation 
gives aggregate consumption as 
 0
0
T T
T
c bP wC
w b rσ δ
  =   + + −  
 (27) 
Now let us assume that the total wage bill T Tw L is a share (1 )α− of total GDP at time T (for 
example this will occur if the production function is Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of α ).  
Hence, 
  0
0
(1 )T T
T T
cC Pb
Y w b r L
α
σ δ
  − =   + + −  
 (28) 
It follows that aggregate consumption depends on three components. The first is the 
initial consumption-wage ratio. The second component contains terms that depend on the birth 
rate and the rate of wage growth. The third term is the ratio of population to workers. Equation 
(28) is multiplicative. Taking r δ=  we can derive a simple linear form for savings by taking 
logs and using the approximation log(1 )x x+ ≈ for x small: 
  
 log( ( , , *)) log log(1 )T T T
T T T
S Old Lg z R
Y b WA WA
σσ α
 
= − + − + + − 
 
 (29) 
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where Old/WA is the old age dependency rate and L/WA is the participation rate of the working 
age population in the labor force. The variable Old refers to those aged above some threshold 
(we use a threshold of 65 years of age) and the working-age population, WA, are adults whose 
age is below the threshold (we take working age to be those aged 15–64). The aggregation 
effects in (29) are similar to the equations usually estimated in the literature. Our theory supports 
a negative effect of the old age dependency rate on savings as in Leff (1969). We also find a 
positive effect of economic growth on savings, particularly when birth rates are low, a variant on 
the “variable rate of growth effect” proposed by Fry and Mason (1982).     
The simple theory we set out in sections (i) and (ii) allows us to separate out the effects of 
individual decision making on aggregate consumption. However, the model given in (28) has a 
number of weaknesses.   
The first is that the theory considers only adults. The population numbers in (28) refer to 
the adult population, and the “birth rate” is the rate of creation of new adults. The youth 
dependency rate may also matter. Given that parents are altruistic and try to smooth household 
per capita (or adult equivalent) consumption, total household consumption will have to be higher 
when there are children present. Rather than incorporate a theory of intra-household transfers 
into the life cycle framework, we simply add a youth dependency rate to mirror the old age 
dependency rate in the empirical formulation.      
A second weakness relates to the assumption of logarithmic utility. In the case of a fixed 
mandatory retirement age, the initial consumption-wage ratio is independent of the level of 
income. However, when the retirement age is endogenous and optimally chosen, our finding that 
the consumption-wage ratio is independent of the level of income is dependent on the 
assumption that we have a logarithmic utility function. Logarithmic utility means that the income 
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and substitution effects of higher wages on retirement cancel out, making the retirement age and 
initial consumption wage ratio independent of the wage level.   
Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2004) show that, given a constant coefficient of relative 
risk aversion of 2, with a higher wage rate, the income effect tends to dominate. With higher 
levels of wages, workers will want to retire earlier, increasing their savings rates while working 
to fund a longer retirement. This suggests that the wage rate should appear in the individual’s 
initial consumption-wage ratio decision. Making these two additions to our aggregate equation 
gives7 
 ( , , , *) log log(1 )T T T TT
T T T T
S Old Young Lh z w R
Y b WA WA WA
σσ φ α
 
= + − + + + − 
 
 (30) 
 
A third shortcoming is that few systems actually have mandatory retirement at a fixed age 
R*. However, other institutional characteristics of social security systems may affect retirement 
behavior and aggregate savings in a similar way. A retirement test refers to a situation where 
drawing social security depends on not having labor income. Although it is possible to keep 
working where there is a retirement test, the implicit incentives to retire may be very large. 
Certain features of a social security system can also affect aggregate savings. A fully funded 
pension system will tend to displace an equal amount of private savings; however, it may 
increase aggregate savings if contribution levels exceed the private savings that people desire 
and if there are borrowing constraints. A pay-as-you-go pension system will tend to reduce 
aggregate savings because it displaces private savings, but the system does not itself lead to 
                                                 
7 Including the youth dependency rate causes no problems in this aggregate equation. However, adding the level of 
wages to the individual's demand for savings does cause problems. In this case, when there is economic growth, the 
wage level of cohorts born in the distant past will have been lower, which will tend to reduce their initial savings 
rate relative to current cohorts. Our aggregation does not allow for this and so the model is an approximation that 
will hold only when the effect of wage levels on initial saving rates is small or the rate of economic growth is low.     
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wealth holding.8 In the empirical work we include a range of features of the pension system, 
instead of focusing solely on an explicit mandatory retirement age.    
 
3. Data  
We construct annual data for a panel of countries over the period 1960 to 2000. We use 
as a measure of savings the gross domestic savings rate (savings divided by GDP) from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002). This combines individual and household 
savings with corporate and government savings, but we assume that corporate and household 
savings are part of household wealth. World Development Indicators also provides our measure 
of life expectancy. Life expectancy data are available about four times per decade for most 
countries in World Development Indicators. We interpolate over intervals of up to two years to 
get an annual series. In our theory, the relevant variable for individual decision making is cohort 
life expectancy; we proxy this with period life expectancy.9 Data on age structure and the young, 
working-age, and old-age populations (the populations aged 0 to 14, 15 to 64, and 65 and over) 
are also from World Development Indicators. 
Data on real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms come from version 6.1 of 
the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). We take the log difference between 
current and ten-year lagged GDP per capita divided by ten (giving the annual average growth 
rate) as our measure of economic growth. We define the “birth rate” of adults as one fifth of the 
population aged 15 to 19 divided by the total population aged 15 and over, using data taken from 
the United Nations’ World Population Prospects (2004). This approximates the annual rate of 
                                                 
8 This assumes that people do not save against the future taxes needed to finance a pay-as-you-go pension system. In 
other words, we do not have complete Ricardian equivalence.  
9 Period life expectancy is the expected life span applying current age specific death rates while cohort life 
expectancy depends on the future death rate of the cohort as it ages.    
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inflow of new adults. Data on labor force numbers before 1980 come from the International 
Labor Organization (1997), and after 1980, from International Labor Organization (2005).   
Data on social security systems come from the Social Security Administration’s Social 
Security Programs Throughout the World (various years 1961–2002). The raw data consist of the 
responses of various countries to a survey sent out by the Social Security Administration. These 
systems are often very complex, with a large number of conditions and caveats not fully 
explained in the responses. It is difficult to create a set of variables that accurately captures the 
elements of the various systems and is consistent across countries.   
We constructed four variables from the Social Security Administration data. We begin by 
defining a dummy variable for universal coverage. We consider a system universal when all 
employees are reported to be covered by the system. We code a system as not universal when 
one or more groups of employees, for example agricultural workers, informal sector workers, 
those in small firms, or the self employed, are excluded. We count as universal those systems 
where some workers in particular sectors, for example public employees, are excluded but are 
reported to be covered by a different system. This approach ignores the possibility that actual 
coverage in “universal” systems may be low when there is an unrecognized informal sector.  
Our second variable is a dummy that indicates the presence of a retirement incentive in 
the system. A retirement incentive occurs when benefits are only payable on retirement, or if 
benefits are conditional on an earnings test. Gruber and Wise (1998) show that in OECD 
countries retirement spikes at ages where retirement incentives begin. In some cases the 
retirement test is strict: retirement prompts pension benefit eligibility that would be lost if work 
continued. In others systems there is a partial reduction in pension benefits if earned income 
continues, and there are incentives to delay retirement in the form of higher pension payouts. We 
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set the retirement test equal to one where there are any retirement incentives reported in the 
system; in other cases we set it to zero. For example, until 2001 the United States’ social security 
system had an earnings test that reduced pension benefits for those below age 70 who continued 
to work (the earnings test now only applies to those who take early retirement, available from 
age 62, and are below age 65). In our data, this counts as having a retirement incentive. 
We also calculate the replacement rate for each observation. This is the size of the annual 
pension, as a percentage of the recipient’s pre-retirement income, for a worker of average income 
(which we take to be income equal to two thirds of GDP per worker) who works from age 17 to 
the reported normal retirement age in the system, under the system's current rules. The 
replacement ratio depends on three components: any basic flat-rate pension, any pension that is 
related to earnings, and any lump sum of accumulated contributions.  
For a flat-rate pension we take this flat rate relative to average earnings as its replacement 
ratio. For earnings-related pensions, there is usually a formula that depends on the number of 
years of contributions. For countries with defined-contribution schemes, we assume the worker 
earns a constant amount and contributions start at 17 and run to the normal retirement age; for 
example, when the normal retirement age is 65 workers have 48 years of contribution. We 
assume that the contributions in the fund earn a real rate of return of 3% a year. We assume that 
upon retirement the accumulated fund is used to finance a single life annuity that guarantees the 
same payout, in real terms, over the life of the pensioner. We take the annuity to pay out a real 
rate of 5.25% per annum for the lifetime of the annuitant, based on current rates for indexed 
linked (i.e. adjusted in line with the retail price index to keep their real value) annuities in the 
United Kingdom.10 Calculating the accumulated value of the pension fund at retirement, this 
                                                 
10 Compulsory purchase of annuities in the United Kingdom diminishes the adverse selection that appears to be 
common in the United States, though it is still present.   
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implies that each 1% of salary contributed to the fund over the working life should generate 
5.7% of earnings as a pension.   
In many particular cases the calculation of the value of pension rights is not 
straightforward. For example, in the United States the benefit rate depends on earnings and 
contributions in a highly non-linear way that favors low-income workers. Our data source does 
not report the details of the annual formula, though it does report the maximum benefit. Due to 
the highly progressive nature of the system, this maximum benefit is close to the benefit of a 
worker with average wages who works his whole life, and we use this to calculate replacement 
rates.11    
In countries that introduce new systems, workers are sometimes allowed to remain in the 
old system; when this occurs we use the characteristics of the new system if it is compulsory for 
new workers. In other cases, workers have a choice of which system to enter.  For example, 1993 
pension reforms in Colombia and Peru gave workers a choice between a defined-contribution 
private pension and a defined-benefit public pension. The system in Peru makes enrollment in 
the defined-contribution system the default when entering employment, with no switching 
thereafter, and this system dominates the private sector; we treat Peru as having a defined-
contribution system after 1993. In Colombia, switching between the systems is allowed for all 
workers and occurs frequently, and take-up of the defined-contribution system has been slow; we 
treat the Colombian system as a defined-benefit system throughout. Another difficult case is 
Denmark. The occupational pension system is “quasi-mandatory” in that membership is 
compulsory for those working in the occupation, and has wide coverage. We treat these 
occupational pension schemes as mandatory and include them in the replacement rate.   
                                                 
11 In this way, we calculate the replacement ratio in the United States to be roughly 40%. This figure is close to the 
number calculated based on more detailed information.   
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     We split the replacement rate into two portions. One is pay-as-you-go, where the 
government pays the benefits. The second is funded, where a fund holds financial assets to meet 
the future claims of the pensioners. Although funded pensions are common in defined-
contribution schemes while pay-as-you-go is common in defined-benefit programs, the 
alignment is not perfect. For example, defined-contribution schemes can invest the contributions 
or can be notional schemes where repayment is drawn from general government funds. We take 
a system to be funded when the assets are held either by an independent provident fund or 
private companies that invest freely in a portfolio of assets.12 We count as pay-as-you-go 
systems those, such as the Sri Lankan system, where the social security fund is limited to hold 
only government debt, on the grounds that this debt reflects an accounting rule within the 
government rather than real funding of the liability. Some countries, such as Switzerland, have a 
two-pillar system in which there is a basic flat-rate pension funded by pay-as-you-go and an 
earnings-related contribution system that is fully funded.   
 This distinction between fully funded and pay-as-you-go systems allows for the effect of 
a high replacement rate on aggregate savings to depend on the system of pension finance.   
 Table 1 shows some illustrative data. For each country we report the universal coverage 
dummy, the retirement incentive dummy, and the replacement rate (funded and pay-as-you-go) 
for 1961, 1981, and 2002. The data set we use contains data for all the years 1961, 1964, 1967, 
1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1997, 
1999, and 2002. For intervening years we use data from the latest available year up to two years 
                                                 
12 We include as funded systems countries like Chile, where pension companies are restricted in buying foreign 
assets. We exclude countries like Argentina, where the bulk of private pension company assets must be held in 
government securities (which have defaulted).      
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back; the social security systems are fairly stable over time with only a small number of changes, 
so this interpolation seems reasonable.13  
 We report descriptive statistics on the data set we use in table 2. The very high maximum 
replacement rate for funded systems is from Singapore in the 1970s, when reported annual social 
security defined-contribution rates (employee and employer combined) exceeded 50% of 
income. Table 3 shows the evolution of the social security variables over time. Comparisons 
should be treated with caution, as the number of countries reporting is larger in later years. It 
nonetheless appears that the portion of systems offering universal coverage is increasing over 
time while the proportion with a retirement incentive is fairly constant at around 50%. Pay-as-
you-go schemes have a replacement rate of around 50% on average. The largest change is the 
rise in the average fully funded replacement rate over the period, a reflection of the number of 
countries, particularly in Latin America, that have introduced fully funded defined-contribution 
schemes as part of pension reform.     
 
4. Estimation and Results 
 
We wish to estimate equation (30) based on data from a panel of countries. We include 
measures of each of the variables in the relationship except the interest rate and the share of labor 
in national income (1 )α− , which we assume to be constant across countries.  
The first nine variables are the factors that affect individual decisions on savings in a 
laissez-faire world. We include the wage level (proxied by two thirds of income per capita), life 
expectancy, and the growth rate of the economy. Because the functional form may be non-linear, 
we perform a Taylor series expansion to the quadratic terms. This leads us to include the square 
                                                 
13 There are a number of cases where reported characteristics of a system change slightly over time with no 
reference to a change in the social security law. We treat these as real changes, though it may be that it is reporting 
accuracy rather than the actual system that has changed.     
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of each of the three variables and the three interaction terms between them. This gives us the 
approximation 
 2 2 21 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9( , , )h z w z w z w z w zwσ φ φ σ φ φ φ σ φ φ σ φ σ φ≈ + + + + + + + +  
for the initial consumption: wage ratio when there is no mandatory retirement.  The next 
four variables – the growth rate divided by the “birth rate,” the old and young age dependency 
ratios, and the log of the labor force participation rate – are the result of aggregation across 
cohorts. We then add our four variables that describe the social security system: a dummy for 
universal coverage, a dummy variable for a retirement incentive, the fully funded replacement 
ratio, and the pay-as-you-go replacement ratio. Finally, each of these institutional social security 
variables is interacted with life expectancy.     
 The savings variable ranges from around zero to 0.5 with an average of about 0.2. To 
ensure that the scale of the independent variables matches the scale of savings (so as to avoid 
very small coefficients, particularly on the interaction terms), we measure income per capita in 
units of $10,000 and life expectancy in units of 100 years.   
 We begin with an ordinary least squares regression, which is reported in column 1 of 
table 3. In column 2 we report a fixed effect specification. A Wald test of the restriction that all 
of the fixed effects are zero has a value of 35.64, which is distributed as F(56, 1685) under the 
null that the fixed effects are all the same. This is a decisive rejection of the null, leading us to 
infer that fixed effects are important.   
 While the fixed effects regression is more robust than simple ordinary least squares, a 
problem of autocorrelation is still present. A test for serial correlation in the fixed effects 
regression using Drukker’s (2003) approach to estimating the test proposed by Wooldridge 
(2002) gives a value of 51.7, which is distributed as F(1, 56) under the null of no autocorrelation; 
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this gives a decisive rejection. One approach would be to estimate the regression allowing for 
serial correlation. However, the serial correlation is likely to be due to misspecification of the 
dynamic nature of the model.   
Our theory suggests a relationship between certain variables and the desired aggregate 
savings rate. For example, changes in any exogenous variables will change steady-state savings 
rates. However, people may not jump immediately to the new consumption level. Habit 
formation and persistence in consumption may mean a gradual move to the new consumption 
level. We can model this as a partial adjustment process. Let y be the savings rate and x be the set 
of variables determining y; a partial adjustment process has the form 
 1 1( ( ) )t t t t ty y x yλ β ε− −− = − +   
where *t ty xβ=  is the optimal level of savings given the exogenous variables tx . Rearranging 
gives 
 1(1 )t t t ty y xλ β ε−= − + +   
This suggests that we should include the lagged savings rate in the regression to correct for the 
dynamic adjustment in the time path of savings.  
 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to create a dynamic fixed effects panel 
model results in biased estimates of all parameters under the usual dummy variable estimation, 
even if the number of countries is large. This is because the lagged dependent variable cannot be 
regarded as independent of the current error (Nickell, 1981). We overcome this problem by using 
the bias correction methods for unbalanced dynamic panels developed by Bruno (2005). We take 
a first-order approximation to the bias (Bruno shows that this usually accounts for 90% of the 
bias using Monte Carlo studies), using a generalized methods of moments estimator to get an 
initial consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to initiate the bias 
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correction. We undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard 
errors.    
The results for the general model allowing for fixed effects and dynamic effects are 
reported in column 3 of table 4. Removing insignificant variables sequentially,14 we arrive at the 
regression shown in column 4 of table 3. A joint test that the 14 coefficient restrictions implied 
by the parsimonious model gives a value of 18.97, which is distributed 2χ (14), and so does not 
reject the null hypothesis that these coefficients are all zero. The regression shown in column 4 
of table 4 is our preferred specification and is robust to country fixed effects and allows for a 
dynamic process by which savings adjusts towards its steady state. 
According to the results reported in column 4 of table 4, higher income per capita 
promotes savings, but this effect becomes less marked as income rises due to the negative 
coefficient on the income per capita squared. A high old-age dependency rate tends to lower the 
savings rate.   
All of the life expectancy terms that do not involve interactions with the social security 
system in the general regression have been eliminated in the parsimonious regression reported in 
column 4 of table 4. This implies that in the absence of a social security system the model 
predicts no effect of life expectancy on savings rates. However, if there is universal coverage and 
a retirement test, an increase in life expectancy tends to push up savings rates, as we would 
expect from the need to finance a longer retirement under conditions of an institutionally fixed 
retirement age. This effect is reduced if there is a pay-as-you-go system with a high replacement 
rate. In this case the need for income in retirement is provided by the defined benefits usually 
found in pay-as-you-go systems. 
                                                 
14 We keep all variables that are significant at the 10% level. 
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The ratio of economic growth to the birth rate is not significant and is dropped from our 
final specification. Our theory predicts these variables should have effects on aggregate savings 
rates; our finding of a lack of effect is probably due to measurement error. The correct measure 
of growth rate is the long-run rate of growth over the lifetimes of those consuming, whereas our 
10-year average may be only loosely connected to the long-run average due to the volatility in 
short-run growth rates (Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers 1993). Similarly, our measure 
of the log of the male participation rate was statistically insignificant and was dropped from 
regression 4 in table 3. The participation rate is included to capture the work-versus-retirement 
decisions of the working-age population, but participation rates vary for many reasons in 
addition to early retirement. 
Several of the social security variables, and their interaction with life expectancy, remain 
in our final specification. We find higher life expectancy is associated with higher savings rates 
when there is universal coverage and a retirement incentive, though the effect is reduced in the 
presence of pay-as-you-go funding.  
The coefficients in columns 3 and 4 of table 4 are not directly comparable with the earlier 
regressions because of the dynamic structure introduced into the model. In table 5 we report the 
long-run effect of a number of variables on steady-state savings rates based on the estimates 
reported in column 4 of table 4. The long-run effect of a higher old-age dependency rate is 
negative and not statistically different from -1, which is consistent with our theory. We estimate 
that when life expectancy rises by 10 years, the savings rate will rise by about 4 percentage 
points when there is a universal pension system and a retirement incentive test in a fully funded 
system. This effect declines as more of the replacement rate is funded through a pay-as-you-go 
system and disappears when the pay-as-you-go replacement rate reaches about 50% of earnings. 
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Note that this effect of a higher life expectancy on steady-state savings is temporary and will 
dissipate in the long run when the higher life expectancy increases the ratio of old to working-
age population. 
Retirement incentives increase the steady-state savings rate by between 2 and 3 
percentage points depending on the level of life expectancy. The effect of moving from a pay-as-
you-go to a fully funded system is negligible at a life expectancy of 66 years (the sample mean) 
but can increase steady state savings rates by 13 percentage points, a very large effect, at a life 
expectancy of 81 (the maximum life expectancy in the sample).  
 
5. Conclusion 
Demographics can influence aggregate savings not only via accounting effects associated 
with the age structure of a population, but also via behavioral effects associated with expected 
longevity. The response to a longer life span can take the form of a longer working life or 
increased savings. The response we see in practice depends on social security arrangements. 
When there are incentives to retire at particular ages, the labor supply response may be muted, 
leading to increased savings for a longer retirement. In terms of life cycle behavior, our model 
only looks at the retirement decision and savings. A possible extension would be to examine the 
effect of life span extensions on schooling decisions as well. Further analysis of the effect of 
expected longevity on life cycle behavior using individual- and family-level data observed under 
different social security systems also seems promising. 
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Table 1 
Retirement and Pension Provision   
 
Country 
 
YEAR 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
 
Replacement 
rate: fully 
funded 
 
Replacement 
rate: pay as 
you go 
 
Retirement 
Incentive 
 
Argentina  1961 1 0.00 0.82 1 
Argentina  1981 1 0.00 0.70 1 
Argentina  2002 1 0.00 0.92 0 
Australia  1961 1 0.00 0.11 1 
Australia  1981 1 0.00 0.19 1 
Australia  2002 1 0.46 0.20 0 
Austria  1961 1 0.00 0.84 1 
Austria  1981 1 0.00 0.80 1 
Austria  2002 1 0.00 0.80 0 
Belgium  1961 1 0.00 0.60 1 
Belgium  1981 1 0.00 0.60 1 
Belgium  2002 1 0.00 0.60 0 
Bolivia  1961 0 0.00 0.96 0 
Bolivia  1981 0 0.00 0.76 0 
Bolivia  2002 1 0.57 0.00 0 
Brazil  1961 0 0.00 1.00 1 
Brazil  1981 1 0.00 0.95 0 
Brazil  2002 1 0.00 1.00 0 
Burkina Faso  1961     
Burkina Faso  1981     
Burkina Faso  2002 0 0.00 0.51 1 
Canada  1961 1 0.00 0.13 0 
Canada  1981 1 0.00 0.38 0 
Canada  2002 1 0.00 0.37 0 
Chile  1961 0 0.00 0.70 0 
Chile  1981 1 0.57 0.00 0 
Chile  2002 1 0.57 0.00 0 
Colombia  1961     
Colombia  1981 0 0.00 0.85 1 
Colombia  2002 0 0.00 0.85 0 
Denmark  1961 1 0.00 0.24 1 
Denmark  1981 1 0.00 0.25 0 
Denmark  2002 1 0.68 0.24 1 
Dominican Republic  1961 0 0.00 0.70 1 
Dominican Republic  1981 0 0.00 0.67 1 
Dominican Republic  2002 1 0.40 0.00 0 
Ecuador  1961 0 0.00 1.00 1 
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Country 
 
YEAR 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
 
Replacement 
rate: fully 
funded 
 
Replacement 
rate: pay as 
you go 
 
Retirement 
Incentive 
 
Ecuador  1981 1 0.00 0.85 1 
Ecuador  2002 1 0.00 0.85 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1961 0 0.00 0.75 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1981 1 0.00 0.80 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2002 1 0.00 0.80 0 
Finland  1961 1 0.00  0 
Finland  1981 1 0.00 0.81 1 
Finland  2002 1 0.00 0.83 1 
France  1961 0 0.00 0.20 0 
France  1981 1 0.00 0.25 0 
France  2002 1 0.00 0.50 1 
West Germany  1961 1 0.00 0.72 0 
West Germany  1981 1 0.00 0.69 1 
Germany  2002 1 0.00 0.83 0 
Ghana  1961     
Ghana  1981 0 0.79 0.00 0 
Ghana  2002 1 0.00 0.80 0 
Greece  1961 0 0.00 1.00 1 
Greece  1981 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Greece  2002 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Hong Kong, China  1961     
Hong Kong, China  1981 1 0.00 0.05 0 
Hong Kong, China  2002 1 0.57 0.00 0 
India  1961 0 0.71 0.00 1 
India  1981 0 0.78 0.00 1 
India  2002 0 0.96 0.00 1 
Indonesia  1961     
Indonesia  1981 0 0.14 0.00 0 
Indonesia  2002 0 0.32 0.00 0 
Ireland  1961 0 0.00 0.17 0 
Ireland  1981 1 0.00 0.15 0 
Ireland  2002 1 0.00 0.11 0 
Israel  1961 1 0.00  1 
Israel  1981 1 0.00 0.66 1 
Israel  2002 1 0.00 0.66 1 
Italy  1961 1 0.00 0.80 0 
Italy  1981 1 0.00 0.80 1 
Italy  2002 1 0.00 0.68 1 
Jamaica  1961     
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Country 
 
YEAR 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
 
Replacement 
rate: fully 
funded 
 
Replacement 
rate: pay as 
you go 
 
Retirement 
Incentive 
 
Jamaica  1981 1 0.00 0.13 1 
Jamaica  2002 1 0.00 0.21 1 
Japan  1961 1 0.00 0.34 1 
Japan  1981 1 0.00 0.71 1 
Japan  2002 1 0.00 0.51 0 
Kenya  1961     
Kenya  1981 1 0.51 0.00 1 
Kenya  2002 1 0.45 0.00 1 
Korea, Rep. 1961     
Korea, Rep. 1981     
Korea, Rep. 2002 1 0.00 0.64 1 
Madagascar  1961     
Madagascar  1981 1 0.00 0.40 1 
Madagascar  2002 1 0.00 0.53 1 
Malaysia  1961 0 0.45 0.00 0 
Malaysia  1981 1 0.59 0.00 1 
Malaysia  2002 1 1.04 0.00 0 
Mali  1961     
Mali  1981 1 0.00 0.51 1 
Mali  2002 1 0.00 0.63 1 
Mexico  1961 0 0.00 0.72 1 
Mexico  1981 1 0.00 0.88 1 
Mexico  2002 1 0.27 0.00 1 
Morocco  1961 0 0.00 0.40 1 
Morocco  1981 0 0.00 0.70 1 
Morocco  2002 0 0.00 0.70 1 
Netherlands  1961 1 0.00 0.32 0 
Netherlands  1981 1 0.00 0.68 0 
Netherlands  2002 1 0.00 0.58 0 
New Zealand  1961 1 0.00 0.13 0 
New Zealand  1981 1 0.00 0.28 0 
New Zealand  2002 1 0.00 0.26 0 
Nigeria  1961     
Nigeria  1981 0 0.54 0.00 1 
Nigeria  2002 0 0.00 0.65 1 
Norway  1961 1 0.00 0.14 0 
Norway  1981 1 0.00 0.51 1 
Norway  2002 1 0.00 0.42 1 
Panama  1961 0 0.00 0.96 1 
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Country 
 
YEAR 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
 
Replacement 
rate: fully 
funded 
 
Replacement 
rate: pay as 
you go 
 
Retirement 
Incentive 
 
Panama  1981 0 0.00 1.00 1 
Panama  2002 0 0.00 1.00 1 
Peru  1961 1 0.00 0.60 0 
Peru  1981 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Peru  2002 1 0.46 0.00 0 
Philippines  1961 1 0.00 0.41 1 
Philippines  1981 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Philippines  2002 1 0.00 0.91 1 
Portugal  1961 0 0.00 0.80 0 
Portugal  1981 1 0.00 0.70 1 
Portugal  2002 1 0.00 0.80 1 
Senegal  1961     
Senegal  1981 1 0.00 0.31 1 
Senegal  2002 1 0.00 0.40 1 
Singapore  1961     
Singapore  1981 1 2.55 0.00 0 
Singapore  2002 1 1.62 0.00 0 
South Africa  1961    1 
South Africa  1981    1 
South Africa  2002 1 0.00 0.20 1 
Spain  1961 0 0.00 0.00 1 
Spain  1981 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Spain  2002 1 0.00 1.00 1 
Sri Lanka  1961     
Sri Lanka  1981 1 0.00 0.90 1 
Sri Lanka  2002 1 0.00 0.90 1 
Sweden  1961 1 0.00 0.77 0 
Sweden  1981 1 0.00 0.66 0 
Sweden  2002 1 0.00 1.43 0 
Switzerland  1961 1 0.00 0.15 0 
Switzerland  1981 1 0.00 0.32 0 
Switzerland  2002 1 0.63 0.18 0 
Taiwan  1961     
Taiwan  1981     
Taiwan  2002 0 0.00 0.20 1 
Tanzania  1961     
Tanzania  1981 0 0.45 0.00 1 
Tanzania  2002 0 0.90 0.00 1 
Tunisia  1961     
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YEAR 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
 
Replacement 
rate: fully 
funded 
 
Replacement 
rate: pay as 
you go 
 
Retirement 
Incentive 
 
Tunisia  1981 0 0.00 0.80 1 
Tunisia  2002 1 0.00 0.80 1 
Turkey  1961 0 0.00 0.35 1 
Turkey  1981 0 0.00 0.60 1 
Turkey  2002 1 0.00 0.79 0 
Uganda  1961     
Uganda  1981 0 0.39 0.00 1 
Uganda  2002 0 0.68 0.00 1 
United Kingdom  1961 1 0.00 0.19 1 
United Kingdom  1981 1 0.00 0.22 1 
United Kingdom  2002 1 0.00 0.41 0 
United States  1961 1 0.00 0.32 1 
United States  1981 1 0.00 0.44 1 
United States  2002 1 0.00 0.45 1 
Uruguay  1961 0 0.00 1.00 0 
Uruguay  1981 1 0.00 0.70 1 
Uruguay  2002 1 0.38 0.22 1 
Venezuela, RB 1961     
Venezuela, RB 1981 0 0.00 0.62 0 
Venezuela, RB 2002 1 0.00 0.60 0 
Vietnam  1961     
Vietnam  1981    1 
Vietnam  2002 0 0.00 0.75 0 
Zambia  1961     
Zambia  1981 0 0.39 0.00 1 
Zambia  2002 0 0.00 0.40 1 
Zimbabwe  1961     
Zimbabwe  1981     
Zimbabwe  2002 0 0.00 1.00 0 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
     
Savings Rate 
 
0.218 0.085 -0.146 0.509 
Annual Wage 
 
9360 0.749 424 33300 
Life Expectancy 
 
66.3 10.4 37.8 81.1 
Wage Growth 
 
0.021 0.019 -0.058 0.095 
Wage Growth/Birth 
Rate 
0.840 0.764 -1.545 4.063 
Ratio of old to 
Working Age 
0.122 0.065 0.039 0.276 
Ratio of young to 
Working Age 
0.572 0.238 0.211 1.076 
Log labor 
participation rate 
-0.094 0.086 -0.317 0.234 
Universal Coverage 
 
0.695 0.460 0 1 
Retirement 
Incentive 
0.584 0.493 0 1 
Replacement rate: 
pay as you go 
0.507 0.331 0 1.232 
Replacement Rate: 
fully funded 
0.121 0.333 0 3.068 
 
Data are based on the 1763 observations from 57 countries over the period 1961–2000 used in 
the regression analysis.
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Table 3   
Averages of the Retirement and Pension Variables over Time 
                  Year 
Variable 
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 
 
Universal 
Coverage 
0.538 0.607 0.607 0.724 0.767 
Retirement 
Incentive 
0.538 0.569 0.696 0.621 0.500 
Replacement 
rate: pay as you 
go 
0.452 0.448 0.499 0.497 0.487 
Replacement 
Rate: fully 
funded 
0.019 0.081 0.099 0.122 0.175 
Number of 
Countries 
39 51 56 58 60 
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Table 4 
Regression Results: Dependent Variable Savings Rate 
 1 2 3 4 
Constant -0.137 
(1.23) 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Lagged savings rate   0.758 
(37.07) 
0.784 
(48.49) 
Wage 0.300 
(4.43) 
0.642 
(6.27) 
0.133 
(1.78) 
0.059 
(5.85) 
Life Expectancy 0.968 
(2.40) 
0.305 
(0.64) 
0.035 
(0.08) 
 
Growth Rate 2.212 
(2.21) 
3.234 
(4.82) 
0.989 
(1.59) 
 
Wage Squared -0.032 
(5.77) 
-0.037 
(4.83) 
-0.006 
(0.83) 
-0.012 
(4.68) 
Life Expectancy Squared -0.701 
(1.91) 
0.075 
(0.16) 
0.066 
(0.16) 
 
Growth Rate Squared 11.174 
(4.07) 
2.743 
(1.17) 
0.872 
(0.48) 
 
Wage times life expectancy -0.211 
(2.08) 
-0.564 
(3.78) 
-0.130 
(1.12) 
 
Wage times growth rate  -0.189 
(0.72) 
0.039 
(0.17) 
0.146 
(0.79) 
 
Life expectancy times growth rate  -7.320 
(4.45) 
-4.960 
(4.26) 
-1.524 
(1.50) 
 
Growth Rate divided by birth rate 0.090 
(9.04) 
0.008 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
 
Ratio of old to working-age 
population 
-0.621 
(13.01) 
-0.891 
(7.53) 
-0.209 
(2.32) 
-0.289 
(4.04) 
Ratio of young to working-age 
population 
0.010 
(0.45) 
-0.054 
(1.75) 
-0.018 
(0.86) 
 
Log labor force participation rate -0.091 
(3.17) 
0.301 
(5.24) 
0.012 
(0.24) 
 
Retirement Incentive  -0.166 
(5.44) 
-0.082 
(2.46) 
0.034 
(1.20) 
 
Replacement rate: fully funded -0.206 
(2.79) 
-0.264 
(3.34) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
 
Replacement rate: pay as you go -0.040 
(0.58) 
0.408 
(6.29) 
0.116 
(2.35) 
0.119 
(4.83) 
Universal Coverage -0.082 
(2.27) 
-0.058 
(1.23) 
-0.051 
(1.28) 
-0.048 
(1.84) 
Retirement Incentive times life 
expectancy 
0.229 
(5.30) 
0.106 
(2.23) 
-0.039 
(0.98) 
0.008 
(2.18) 
Replacement rate (fully funded) 
times life expectancy 
0.336 
(3.31) 
0.395 
(3.50) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
 
Replacement rate (pay as you go) 
times life expectancy 
0.013 
(0.13) 
-0.590 
(6.08) 
-0.168 
(2.23) 
-0.182 
(4.76) 
Universal coverage times life 
expectancy 
0.091 
(1.63) 
0.114 
(1.53) 
0.088 
(1.42) 
0.084 
(2.16) 
R2 
 
0.495 0.768 0.889 0.889 
t statistics in parenthesis (based on robust standard in columns 1 and 2 and bootstrap standard error 
estimates in columns 3 and 4). 
Based on 1763 observations from 57 countries over the period 1961–2000.  
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Table 5 
Effects on Steady-State Savings Rate 
 Effect on Steady-State 
Savings Rate 
(percentage points) 
  
Old/ Working Age Ratio rises by 0.01 
 
 
-1.336 
(4.07) 
  
Life expectancy rises by 1 year with universal 
coverage, mandatory retirement, and a fully 
funded system 
0.424 
(2.27) 
Life expectancy rises by 1 year with universal 
coverage, mandatory retirement and a pay-as-
you-go system with replacement rate of 0.5 
0.003 
(0.02) 
Life expectancy rises by 1 year with universal 
coverage, mandatory retirement and a pay-as-
you-go system with replacement rate of 1.0 
-0.418 
(1.90) 
  
Effect of introducing a retirement incentive 
with life expectancy at 66 years 
2.489 
(2.23) 
Effect of introducing a retirement incentive 
with life expectancy at 81 years 
3.055 
(3.48) 
  
Effect of moving from a pay-as-you-go 
system (replacement rate 1.0) to a fully 
funded system with life expectancy 66 years 
0.005 
(0.16) 
Effect of moving from a pay-as-you-go 
system (replacement rate 1.0) to a fully 
funded system with life expectancy 81 years 
13.148 
(2.93) 
 
Based on the regression results in column 4 of Table 4. 
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